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The transatlantic fight that erupted in late 2002 and early 2003 over the war in Iraq was no freak 
conjunction of unrelated dynamic systems that whirled out of control. The rupture was a real test of the 
new Pax Americana and the new hegemonic style of the United States—but that style itself was the 
biggest single variable in the schism. The scale of the confrontation was measured in the unusually wide 
spectrum of transatlantic quarrels, the vitriol in the polemics, and the ill will that went far beyond mere 
interests to offend the self-definition, self-identity, and self-importance of both sides of the Atlantic. 
Tracing the political developments in dealings between the United States and Europe since 9-11, this 
article assesses the current state of diplomatic affairs across the Atlantic and the implications of 
American actions in Iraq for the future of the transatlantic relationship. Had it not been for the catalyst of 
9-11 and the subsequent American determination to attack Iraq, the diverging US and European political 
mentalities might conceivably have accommodated their growing differences without crisis.  
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Introduction 
Neither the BBC’s ‘perfect storm’ simile nor structural determinism alone begins to capture the 
essence of the worst US-European clash in half a century. The transatlantic fight that erupted in late 
2002 and early 2003 over war in Iraq was no freak conjunction of unrelated dynamic systems that 
whirled out of control. Nor was it some pre-programmed reflex of estrangement once the Berlin Wall 
fell and the pressure of the Soviet threat lifted.  
The rupture was a real test of the new Pax Americana and the new hegemonic style of the United 
States—but that style itself was the biggest single variable in the schism. The neoconservative 
earthquake after 9/11 transformed the US from the guarantor of the status-quo of the twentieth century 
into a revolutionary power in the twenty-first century, and supplanted America’s collaborative cold-
war leadership with a more muscular, unilateral, and crusading exercise of hegemony.
1 And it set off a 
shock among continental Europeans that was hardly less traumatic than the shock the al Qaeda attacks 
of September 11, 2001 inflicted on Americans.
2 
The scale of the confrontation was measured in the unusually wide spectrum of transatlantic 
quarrels, the vitriol in the polemics, and the ill will that went far beyond mere interests to offend the 
self-definition, self-identity, and self-importance of both sides of the Atlantic. 
Diverging World Views  
The broad spectrum of the rows needs little elaboration. Even before their showdown over war in Iraq, 
Americans and Europeans argued about the Kyoto Protocol on curbing greenhouse gases; the 
International Criminal Court; an array of arms-control treaties banning or limiting land mines, nuclear 
tests, and chemical and biological weapons; genetically-foods; privacy; the death sentence; abortion; 
and numerous other issues. These disputes reinforced each other—and so did long-standing mutual 
disapproval of domestic social choices made on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Americans 
criticized what they viewed as Europe’s bloated government, exorbitant social welfare, the cornucopia 
of labour benefits that deter entrepreneurs from generating jobs, and other impediments in listless 
European economies. Europeans, while they admired the openness and energy of American society, 
were disturbed by what they regarded as its ruthlessness toward life’s losers—along with promiscuous 
violence, an addiction to guns, the world’s highest per capita prison population, and a death penalty 
that targeted blacks disproportionately. 
Similarly, the bad temper in the relationship needs little elaboration. Muscular Americans mocked 
craven Europeans
3 and objected strenuously to what they saw as a surge in anti-Americanism, anti-
Semitism, ingratitude, and disloyalty in Europe.
4 Conversely, the European political class felt 
degraded by the sheer contempt for Europe it encountered in the Bush administration.
5 
And, of course, self-identification diverged sharply between the American ‘city set on a hill’ and ‘post-
modern’ Europe. The United States viewed itself as uniquely righteous and wise in its policies because, 
having invented modern democracy, it clearly had the best democracy in the world and, not coincidentally, 
the best absorption of immigrants.
6 American elites (though not yet the man in the street)
7 scorned 
Europeans as spoiled, weak, cowardly free riders on the US supply of the public good of global security. 
It followed that if the American system was the globe’s best, then the policies selected by the 
American government too, ipso facto, must be the best policies for the globe.
8 The US Congress had 
every moral right to insist on the extraterritorial reach of its legislation on Cuban sanctions or business 
accounting practices—and to be outraged at EU application of European cartel laws to block American 
mergers. Washington, which under an earlier administration had been a prime initiator of the 
International Criminal Court, had every duty, not only to withdraw its signature from the treaty, but to 
crusade against the court by stopping military aid to Central European or other states that signed on to it.  Elizabeth Pond 
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Moreover, Americans knew that they were uniquely dynamic in economic growth in the 1990s. 
Their productivity far outstripped Europe’s.
9 The US powered the 1990s’ boom, and even after the 
bubble burst, the US continued to lead the world as the globe’s most insatiable consumer. Willy-nilly, 
European stock markets followed Wall Street plunges and recoveries and did not initiate them. 
Above all, Americans knew that they were the world’s only remaining superpower. Their Revolution 
in Military Affairs, with its dazzling C4 (command, control, communications, and computing), precision 
weapons, and net-centric battlefield intelligence and management, so far surpassed both foes and allies 
that few Europeans could still fight at the side of US forces. Washington’s annual dollar outlay for 
defence was double that of the combined defence expenditures of all European Union members.  
A final source of America’s flush of power was the extraordinary US prowess in setting the global 
political agenda. When the administration decided to go all out to develop a missile-defence system, 
then foreign opposition to this program collapsed. When the US decided to torpedo the International 
Criminal Court, on this, too, Europeans muted their voices. 
The European sense of self was very different. After millennia of assuming that frequent bloodshed 
was normal, inevitable, and even (until World War I) heroic, the Europeans—under US leadership—
finally rebelled against the habit of war in the wake of the carnage of World War II. Washington 
forced the Europeans to cooperate in joint planning in order to receive Marshall Plan aid in 
reconstruction. They duly banded together to form the European Coal and Steel Community and then 
the European Community; they inaugurated unprecedented transparency in opening their mid-term 
military planning to the scrutiny of neighbours in NATO; and in the process they created 
unprecedented peace on their continent.
10 After 300 years of the nation-state and a balance of all 
against all, they rejected not only Hobbes, but also the inviolability of state sovereignty. French and 
Germans became reconciled to the point of wondering how they could ever have considered each 
other arch enemies. In conscious imitation, Germans and Dutch, Germans and Poles, and even Poles 
and Ukrainians too, in more rudimentary fashion, effected reconciliation.
11 
Notably, despite widespread scepticism, this growing cooperation survived the demise of the 
common Russian enemy. Notably, it finally solved the old ‘German question’ of how to keep the 
vigorous, populous Teutons from overwhelming their neighbours, by embedding even a reunified 
Germany in a strong European structure and subsuming national German identity to a common 
European identity.
12 In this counterintuitive new system states meddle in unprecedented fashion in the 
internal affairs of their neighbours, and consensus is reached by exhaustion at marathon gabfests. The 
best scribe of this phenomenon, Robert Cooper, classifies European states as ‘post-modern.’ They 
know they are too small to cope alone with cross-border problems of pollution or capital flows or 
immigration and have therefore invented a new form of supranational governance by progressively 
‘pooling’ their sovereignty to gain more control over their destinies. This novel mindset distinguishes 
them from ‘modern’ nationalist states like China, Russia, or the United States, say, or from the chaotic 
‘pre-modern’ states like the Taliban’s Afghanistan or Somalia.
13 
9/11 and the War in Afghanistan  
But for the catalyst of 9/11 and the subsequent American determination to attack Iraq, the diverging 
US and European political mentalities might conceivably have accommodated their growing 
differences without crisis. Destruction of the World Trade Towers on September 11, 2001 by al Qaeda 
suicide militants, however—and the never-solved anthrax attacks that followed—shattered Americans’ 
assumption of US invulnerability and left the superpower with volatile mixed feelings of omnipotence 
and special victimization, and with a sense of unbearable threat that Europeans did not share.
14 
Europeans, having suppressed their own domestic terrorists in the 1970s and 1980s, found US alarm 
exaggerated. Americans felt that Europeans wilfully downplayed the danger that rogue states might 
channel weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to suicide bombers—and were appeasing Islamic states 
in order to let the US be the lonely target of Islamist terrorism. The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy Over Iraq 
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Immediately after 9/11 there was a groundswell of European sympathy for the United States. Le 
Monde proclaimed, ‘Nous sommes tous américains.’ 
15 NATO invoked its Article 5 for the first time 
ever to declare this attack on the US an attack on all alliance members. Some 200,000 Germans gathered 
spontaneously at the Brandenburg Gate for a pro-American rally. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
pledged ‘unlimited solidarity’ with America in the Bundestag, then risked his post on a vote of 
confidence to carry the war-averse Germans further than ever before in military engagement to send 
Special Forces to help the US operation in Afghanistan. The German Embassy in Washington 
established a fund to aid 9/11 victims, expecting to collect several tens of thousands of dollars—and 
was overwhelmed by the $42 million that poured in. And the Bundesnachrichtendienst swiftly provided 
its counterpart Central Intelligence Agency with the clue that led to the arrest of the alleged ‘twentieth 
hijacker,’ Zacarias Moussaoui.
16 Berlin’s reaction was especially important, not only because today’s 
Germans resemble Americans more than do any other Europeans, but also because Bonn/Berlin, for 
half a century, had been the quiet bridge-builder between the US and an often anti-American France. 
Along with this wave of very human pro-American emotion, there was strong political support for 
the initial policy responses of the Bush administration. European governments viewed American 
pressure on Pakistan to be either for or against the US as necessary to force Islamabad to stop 
harbouring al Qaeda networks and Wahhabi madrasas that preached hatred of the West. They 
appreciated Washington’s warding off of a nuclear confrontation between Pakistan and India over 
Kashmir. They welcomed too Bush’s restraint in resisting both the notion of a Christian-Islamic clash 
of civilizations and the war on Saddam Hussein that administration hardliners were already promoting, 
if without any proof of Iraqi collusion with al Qaeda or possession of nuclear weapons.
17 They were 
relieved by what they interpreted, despite Washington’s rebuff to NATO’s offers of help,
18 as a return 
from unilateralism to multilateralism in efforts to build a large anti-terror coalition as President George 
H. W. Bush had done in his Gulf war a decade earlier. Their only objection to the American military 
campaign in Afghanistan was that they were allowed only a minor role in it. 
Above all, at this fraught moment, Europeans accepted and even craved US leadership, as they had for the 
previous half century. If the US did not lead, no one did in the community of industrialized democracies. 
As the cold-war axiom had it, the Europeans loved to be led by the US—in the direction the Europeans 
wanted to go. In late 2001, they thought, Bush was taking them in the direction they wanted to go. 
To be sure, Europeans already had misgivings about Bush’s black-and-white views and certitude that 
he was sent by God to lead America in its time of need, about the almost exclusive reliance of the 
administration on military countermeasures, and about its zealous guardianship of Washington’s monopoly 
on determining how to vanquish evil.
19 More distressing to the Europeans, however, was their own disarray 
in the crisis. Instead of rallying to forge their much-vaunted Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP), 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair rejuvenated the old Anglo-Saxon special relationship, while other 
Europeans leaders elbowed each other to win their own individual invitations to Crawford, Texas. 
The Long Road to Baghdad 
It was at the beginning of 2002 that transatlantic relations deteriorated palpably. From the European 
point of view, the triggers of the quarrels were Bush’s State of the Union address at the end of January 
and Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s conduct at the blue-ribbon Munich Security 
Conference in early February. From the American point of view, the triggers were European dissent 
from American leadership and a surge of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism in Europe, as North 
African immigrants in France in particular desecrated Jewish synagogues and memorials. 
The most dismaying elements for America’s allies in Bush’s State of the Union address were its 
downgrading of Europeans as not even worthy of mention, and the lumping together of Iraq, North 
Korea, and Iran as an ‘axis of evil.’
20 The speech presaged possible American attacks, not only on 
Iraq, but also on Iran, a country the Europeans had been cultivating in an effort to support its many Elizabeth Pond 
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young would-be reformers, modernizers, and liberalizers. Treating Tehran as a pariah, they feared, 
would only strengthen the hard-line ayatollahs. 
The most dismaying element for Europeans in Wolfowitz’s performance in Munich was his 
emphatic repetition of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s admonition that from then on the 
mission would determine the coalition in any American military operation, not vice versa. The clear 
message, as the Deputy Secretary authoritatively lectured the NATO Defence Ministers above his 
rank, was that the transatlantic alliance they had come to think of as immutable was, for Washington, 
expendable. It could and now would be replaced by ad hoc assemblies of American subordinates. 
On Iraq, Americans and Europeans agreed that President Saddam Hussein was a nasty oppressor of 
Iraqis and a would-be megalomaniac threat to his regional neighbours. Europeans thought, however, that 
in the dozen years since he had been pushed out of Kuwait, Hussein had been effectively contained by 
United Nations embargos and enforcement of Iraqi no-fly-zones by American and British planes, and 
prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons or again firing chemical weapons on enemies in a repetition 
of his nastiness in the 1980s. Nor, despite their pleas for such information, were the Europeans given any 
evidence by the US of a link between Iraq and terrorists. They therefore saw no urgency in running the 
high risks of unintended consequences in invading Iraq. Their own intelligence and what they saw of US 
intelligence, seemed to indicate that while Baghdad was working hard to acquire nuclear weapons, it was 
still several years away from getting the crucial fissile materials, and could be kept equally far away in 
the future.
21 The one thing that might induce the rational Hussein to a desperate launch of the chemical 
weapons he was still thought to possess—perhaps against Israeli targets—would be an invasion that 
threatened his existence and made him think he had nothing left to lose, Europeans contended. 
The political dangers, they continued, were that an attack on Iraq could break up this crucial Arab 
country, with Iran taking over parts of the south, Turkey the Kurdish territory to the north. Especially 
if an invasion were mounted with the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation still at a boil, they feared, the 
consequences could destabilize the entire Middle-East. They found naive the American expectation 
that defeat of Hussein would make Iraqis democratic and then spread democracy throughout the 
region. They found it far more likely that an occupied Iraq would be the best possible breeding ground 
for al Qaeda, would draw resources away from the more essential fight against terrorists, and perhaps 
even enable fundamentalists to get their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. More basically, they 
had had the precept inculcated in them over two generations (not least by the Americans) that use of 
force in defence of stability and the status quo was moral, but use of force in a revolutionary gamble 
was not. They therefore found it alarming to hear their mentors increasingly singing the praises of 
democratizing the medieval Islamic world by the sword. Historical memories of the devastation of the 
Thirty Years War and of Napoleon’s ‘revolution in boots’—the very kind of bloodshed they had 
worked so assiduously to escape after 1945—returned.  
A number of American generals and foreign-policy veterans from the administration of President 
Bush père shared these worries, it seemed; in summer of 2002 leaks about military planning in the US 
media and op-ed columns by former National Security Council adviser Brent Scowcroft, former 
Secretary of State James Baker III, and even the delphic former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
obliquely challenged administration assumptions about Iraq.
22 George W. Bush’s own Middle East 
envoy, General Anthony Zinni (who subsequently lost his pro bono post) was characteristic in the 
direction of his comments but uncharacteristic in his bluntness in saying, ‘Attacking Iraq now will 
cause a lot of problems […] It might be interesting to wonder why all the generals see it the same way, 
and all those that never fired a shot in anger and [are] really hell-bent to go to war see it a different 
way […] The Middle East peace process, in my mind, has to be a higher priority. Winning the war on 
terrorism has to be a higher priority […] Our relationships in the region are in major disrepair [and] we 
need to quit making enemies we don’t need to make enemies out of […] There’s a deep chasm 
growing between that part of the world and our part of the world. And it’s strange, about a month after 
9/11, they were sympathetic and compassionate toward us.’ 
23 The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy Over Iraq 
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Cheney’s Call for Regime Change in Iraq 
At the end of August Vice President Dick Cheney silenced the doubters with a speech advocating a 
war on Iraq to pre-empt a potential future threat from Baghdad by effecting regime change.
24 At this 
point the new American strategy of ‘pre-emption’—which Bush had adumbrated at his West Point 
graduation address in June and would shortly be enshrined in the new National Security Strategy—
took on concrete form. In principle, European diplomats acknowledged the need to expand the leeway 
for pre-emption allowed under international law in an age when a single unblocked chemical or 
nuclear weapon could obliterate millions in an instant. In practice, however, they saw no imminent 
threat in the wily, secular Saddam Hussein and viewed the war Cheney was promoting as at best an 
optional war. On this point, as former British Foreign Minister Robin Cook’s subsequent diaries and 
testimony about the suicide of British government scientist David Kelly revealed, there was far more 
consensus between the sceptical governments across the Channel and the pro-American British 
government than was publicly apparent at the time.
25 Europeans wondered how many other regimes 
Washington might now decide to topple, and whether the American voters’ patience would last long 
enough to complete real reconstruction after such coups. 
In late summer of 2002 Gerhard Schröder was in the run-up to an election the polls predicted he 
would lose. He had already picked up the anti-war theme on August 5—in violation of a promise to 
Bush not to touch the subject, US officials complained. After the Cheney speech Schröder’s rejection of 
German military or financial participation in any ‘adventure’ in Iraq joined the down-home issue of 
coping with summer floods as the staples in his campaign. The chancellor advocated a ‘German way’, a 
vague phrase he never defined and seemed to apply interchangeably to domestic and foreign policy—but 
one that evoked in American listeners the historical ghosts of a German sonderweg, or ‘special way’, 
between East and West. Washington understood this as a summons to German defiance of American 
foreign policy. Moreover, unlike the more ambiguous French at the time, Schröder allies said 
categorically that Berlin would not join any war on Iraq even if the Security Council blessed it.
26 For a 
country that put so much stock on multilateralism in general and the United Nations in particular, this 
was an oddly unilateralist stance. It appealed to anti-war east German voters in particular, however. 
With their ballots, Schröder’s Social Democratic-Green coalition narrowly won re-election, trouncing 
maverick extremist right candidates, as usual,
27 and, more unusually, wiping out the east German post-
communist Party of Democratic Socialism after its decade as a party on the national level. 
Washington censured Schröder for running against the United States for the first time in the 
electoral history of the Federal Republic. And after the German justice minister—talking with several 
dozen constituents three days before the election—said both Bush and Hitler resorted to foreign wars 
to divert attention from domestic problems, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice accused the 
Germans of having ‘poisoned’ relations.
28 The White House demanded that the chancellor fire his 
minister within 24 hours, before the election—and when he did so only on the day after the election, 
Bush ostracized Schröder for the next year, refusing to congratulate him on his victory, to meet him, or 
to take his phone calls.
29 Reflecting administration anger, influential Pentagon adviser Richard Perle 
declared publicly that Schröder should resign. 
After his September 22 re-election the chancellor followed the customary pendulum of politics. 
While still rejecting any German combat role in the impending war, he toned down his anti-war rhetoric 
and reemphasized Berlin’s commitment to all NATO obligations, including full American use of 
German airspace and bases, logistical support, assumption by Bundeswehr soldiers of guard duty at US 
bases in Germany to free American troops for war, continued German participation in airborne AWACS 
surveillance flights, loan of Patriot anti-missile systems and armoured Fuchs biological and chemical 
weapons detectors and decontaminators to Israel, Turkey, and Kuwait (with the Patriots to Turkey 
detouring via the Netherlands and picking up Dutch crews in order to keep Schröder’s campaign pledge 
of abstention from the war). In a notable shift for a country that on constitutional grounds had no combat 
troops abroad a decade earlier, the Germans now had almost 10,000 peacekeeping troops abroad—a Elizabeth Pond 
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small number compared with US forces, but more than any other country. In Kabul they would further 
shortly assume co-command, with the Dutch, of the International Security Assistance Forces.
30 
In the poisoned bilateral atmosphere, this contribution did not assuage Washington. As one German 
official put it, Bush made it clear that while he deemed Russia’s Vladimir Putin a man he could trust, 
he deemed Gerhard Schröder a man he could not trust.  
For Washington the central issue of the contretemps seemed to be German betrayal of America. 
The burden of proof was not on the US to demonstrate the imminent threat that would justify a drastic 
resort to war; a potential growing threat sufficed to require preventive war. The burden of proof fell 
instead on the Germans, to demonstrate their loyalty to the US they owed so much to, from 1945 on 
through reunification in 1990. 
For several months after the Cheney speech, Europeans remained confused. On first hearing—even 
though they had been given no advance notice of the speech, as normal diplomatic practice would 
prescribe before a major foreign-policy announcement—they regarded the vice president’s speech as a 
statement of official US policy and responded accordingly. They were reproached by administration 
contacts, however, for jumping to conclusions without giving Washington the benefit of the doubt. 
American policy was shaped in the rough and tumble of competing voices, the Europeans were told; 
no decisions about going to war had yet been made.
31 
The Europeans, adapting to this admonition, then shifted, underestimated the vice president’s 
importance, and accepted the judgment of Bush’s insider biographers, Bob Woodward and David 
Frum, that Cheney’s role was just a subordinate one of saluting the president.
32 They had not yet 
caught on to the policy-setting power of what Zbigniew Brzezinski later called Cheney’s own parallel 
‘national security council’.
33 And anyway, if the vice president’s drumbeat of war was the official 
American position, why had not the president himself proclaimed such a departure from previous 
policy? Why did US officials continue to maintain (as they would throughout the massive US troop 
build-up in the Gulf that began shortly right up to a few days before war started in March 2003) that 
the whole issue of Iraq was wide open and the administration had not yet made up its mind?
34 And 
since Bush, at Blair’s urging, went to the UN in September to seek an imprimatur for enforcing UN 
prohibitions on Iraqi WMD programs, didn’t this mean that the president was turning multilateral after 
all and would seek a diplomatic solution? Only half a year later would a senior White House official 
inform the Germans that a decision to go to war had already been made prior to Cheney’s speech. 
Only then would Europeans learn that the US had already begun softening-up military strikes against 
Iraqi fibre-optics communications in June of 2002.
35 
The Lull before the Storm 
On November 8, after a two-month French-American minuet about the wording, the UN Security 
Council agreed unanimously on Resolution 1441 calling on Saddam Hussein to allow international 
inspections in Iraq to resume and threatening unspecified ‘serious consequences’ if Iraq was found to 
be in ‘material breach’ of longstanding UN bans on Iraqi WMD programs. UN teams under former 
head of the International Atomic Energy Agency Hans Blix immediately took up the task. In the 
deliberate ambiguity that usually attends such compromises, the US interpreted the French signature 
and lobbying for unanimous adoption of the resolution as a promise that Paris would eventually sign a 
second resolution as war approached that would specifically authorizing the threatened ‘serious 
consequences’. And indeed, all the diplomatic signals seemed to indicate that France was simply 
playing hard to get in order to join the American action at the last minute at the highest political price 
it could extract from Washington. In mid-December 2002 a senior French general informed the 
Pentagon that if the Security Council approved, France would send 15,000 troops, 100 planes, and an 
aircraft carrier to join in the invasion.
36 The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy Over Iraq 
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At this point—even though Washington and Paris clearly had quite different scenarios in mind—
the US-French schism was not irrevocable. In late November an upbeat NATO summit in Prague 
agreed amicably on two shifts to keep the alliance relevant to the new security threats. In a major 
departure from its 50-year precept that it was a defensive status-quo alliance that was non-
interventionist outside NATO territory, the alliance approved out-of-area operations in principle. And 
to carry out intervention in future Afghanistan-like crises, it created a NATO Reaction Force. At first, 
some Europeans feared that the NRF might be a disguised American Foreign Legion. But eventually 
the view prevailed that this was a credible American offer to give NATO a role in the asymmetrical 
fight against terrorism and help strengthen the EU’s projected reaction force.
37 
Then on December 13—after a European Union summit promised Ankara serious consideration of 
Turkish EU membership by the end of 2004—a landmark agreement was reached between NATO and 
the European Union on coordinating their security efforts. In cases where NATO itself was not engaged, 
it would give planning, command, and logistical support to the European Rapid Reaction Force of 
60,000. This would ensure that the ERRF did not take on operations it could not carry out, preserve 
NATO’s ‘escalation dominance’, and avoid ‘renationalization’ of security to European countries acting 
on their own. The EU had been jolted into a ‘strategic re-awakening’, as veteran analyst Julian Lindley-
French put it—a realization that it could not just tend its own garden of Eden and let America take care 
of global strategic threats. And the US was acknowledging that the EU could be helpful to it.
38 
The lull did not last long. By January 2003 the (then) three-month-long US ostracism of Gerhard 
Schröder pushed him into the arms of a colleague he had previously shown no particular liking for, 
French President Jacques Chirac.
39 This unwonted embrace by the previously staunch Atlanticist 
Germans in turn tempted Chirac to go further in baiting Washington than he had hitherto done. 
Washington reacted by staging a showdown over the issue of NATO solidarity with Turkey. Tempers rose. 
The stage was set in the razzamatazz leading up to the celebration in January of the fortieth 
anniversary of the Elysée Treaty of post-World War II French-German reconciliation. Chirac and 
Schröder hardened their opposition to the coming war, and to the second UN resolution that the US 
was seeking to declare that Iraq was in fact in ‘material breach’ of Resolution 1441. Washington held 
that it required no such finding to justify an invasion of Iraq, but it sought the second resolution at the 
urging of Tony Blair, who needed it to convince the sceptical British public of the war’s legitimacy.  
To the mounting frustration of Washington, Chirac now argued that all Resolution 1441 authorized 
at this stage was more intensive international inspections in Iraq. He threatened to veto any UN 
resolution that would help America and began mobilizing, successfully, a majority of other Security 
Council members against the US. And he began this campaign in a way that embarrassed and 
alienated even the moderate Secretary of State Colin Powell. The French insisted that Powell skip the 
important political appearances he was scheduled to make in the US on Martin Luther King Day, 
January 20, to come to the UN instead and discuss what was billed as a session on countering 
terrorism. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin used his press conference after the Security 
Council meeting, however, to make a pointed attack on Washington. If the US invaded Iraq, he said, 
this would be ‘a victory for the law of the strongest’. Powell felt ambushed, by all accounts out of 
Washington, and thereafter pleaded the hard-line case for war in the UN with full passion.
40 Rumsfeld 
promptly scorned the ‘old Europe’ of France and Germany and welcomed the ‘new Europe’ of Poland 
and other enthusiastic American allies in Central Europe. Next, Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and 
Denmark, along with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, wrote a major opinion essay in the 
Wall Street Journal (without informing France and Germany beforehand) that implicitly backed the 
approaching US war in Iraq. Ten NATO and EU candidates followed with an American-drafted, 
somewhat more explicit pro-US declaration.
41 Memorably, the angry Chirac told reporters that the 
Central European candidates for EU membership had missed a good opportunity to shut up and 
threatened to veto their entry into the Union.
42  Elizabeth Pond 
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The American government lauded the 18 courageous European signers of the statements, for the 
benefit of an American public that supported war, according to opinion polls, only if allies joined the 
US in the expedition. ‘France and Germany do not speak for Europe’, a bipartisan Sense of the 
Congress resolution stated and praised ‘the majority of Europe’s democracies’ that endorsed the war. 
Democratic Congressman Tom Lantos decried the ‘blind intransigence and utter ingratitude’ of the old 
Europeans for their rescue by Americans from Hitler and Stalin and asserted that the failure of Paris 
and Berlin to ‘honor their [NATO] commitments is beneath contempt.’ George F. Will wrote off 
NATO as ‘a thing of ridicule’ and asked why any American troops should remain ‘in an 
unsympathetic country such as Germany.’ The Congressional restaurant renamed French fries 
‘freedom fries’; some Republicans sought a boycott of Perrier and French wines if the EU continued to 
ban imports of genetically-modified American foods. Rumsfeld savoured telling a Congressional 
hearing that some countries were not helping the US—like Cuba, Libya, and Germany. 
To the dismay of his own foreign ministry and the editorial pages of the major German 
newspapers, on the left as well as on the right, Chancellor Schröder now declared flatly that Germany 
would not vote for any UN resolution that would be taken as justifying war.
43 This was no longer 
campaign rhetoric—or at least it had no positive impact on voters, who gave the Social Democrats 
their worst showing ever in regional elections in early February. Instead, the chancellor’s defiance of 
the US this time was a deliberate policy choice to magnify rather than minimize differences. US 
Ambassador to Germany Daniel Coats dismissed Germany as no longer relevant.
44 
Berlin did indeed pay a huge price in loss of ‘relevance’ for Schröder’s Gaullist lurch and 
estrangement from the US. The chancellor forfeited yet again any chance of cutting the exorbitant EU 
farm subsidies that the Germans basically pay for and the French basically consume. He abandoned 
the traditional German championing of the smaller EU states’ interests to embrace the kind of big-state 
directorate the French had long sought—and he dropped Germany’s post-cold war tutoring of the new 
Central European democracies for the EU membership the French long tried to block. The isolated 
Schröder had to pay so much, he told confidantes, because he now needed Chirac and feared that Paris 
would side with the American war at the last minute, leaving Berlin utterly alone in its anti-war 
stance.
45 The precept that had governed German foreign policy ever since the signing of the Elysée 
treaty—that US-German relations must always take precedence even over the crucial French-German 
relationship—seemed to be at an end.
46 Schröder’s anti-war stance was certainly popular throughout 
Europe, even in Britain, Spain, Italy, and other countries whose governments supported America’s 
Iraq war. Public opinion opposed the war with majorities ranging from clear to overwhelming across 
Europe, while general public approval of the US across Europe plummeted correspondingly.
47 But this 
hardly compensated for Schröder’s constriction of Berlin’s room for diplomatic manoeuvre. 
By the end of January Washington gave up trying for a second resolution. 
Transatlantic Showdown 
As if these pyrotechnics weren’t bad enough, NATO now embarked on one of the most bizarre 
confrontations in its history. The issue was alliance endorsement of advance military planning to help 
Turkey defend itself in case of war. Formal authorization was hardly needed; such contingency 
planning occurs continuously, and various Turkish scenarios were already under discussion in the 
planning staff, according to a senior officer at SHAPE headquarters.
48 But the US wanted to maximize 
the pressure on Iraq by recruiting the fledgling new Islamic government in Ankara to the cause of the 
war on Iraq. The Turkish parliament balked, with an eye to the 94 percent of Turks who opposed the 
war; Washington presented Ankara with carrots and sticks in promises of NATO and US military and 
financial assistance—but also in speculation about the reduced strategic importance of Turkey once 
the US had occupied Iraq.
49 France and Germany opposed formal NATO approval of allegedly 
defensive aid to Turkey—in clear preparation for an American and British invasion of Iraq—as a 
thinly disguised effort to get NATO sanction for the impending war itself, a point Washington seemed The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy Over Iraq 
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to have in mind. Indeed, the US gave every sign that it wanted to make Schröder eat crow publicly. 
Personally, the chancellor assured the Turks that he would help them—but at the same time he was 
showing the 71 percent of Germans who opposed the war that he could say no to the US. Germany, 
France, and Belgium refused to go along with the required unanimous vote in the NATO Council. 
There must be no automatism, they argued, no NATO prejudgment that the looming war was justified.  
Securing the imprimatur of the political North Atlantic Council of permanent ambassadors to the 
NATO headquarters quickly became a test of wills. The US kept threatening that NATO would be 
dead if a statement of solidarity with Turkey were not forthcoming. After a month of wrangling, 
language acceptable to Berlin about ‘defensive’ assistance for Turkey was found—and the decision 
was whisked out of the Council and into NATO’s Defence Planning Committee, a body Paris did not 
belong to, as a political but not military member of the alliance. 
However ridiculous the issue, what was at stake was the survival of the alliance. After half a century 
of defending Europe against the twenty Soviet divisions in East Germany, instituting unprecedented 
confidence-building in open shared medium-term military planning, socializing American and German 
and Turkish and Greek officers to mutual trust, and helping the new Central European democracies to 
bring their armies under civilian control, NATO now faced possible extinction. Americans saw the 
French and Germans as the villains. Not a few Europeans saw the Americans as the villains in putting 
the world’s longest-lasting alliance at risk in their compulsion to invade Iraq. Americans thought the 
French were trying to declare Europe’s independence from the US. The French and Germans thought 
it was the US that was trying to declare independence from the fetters of alliance. Only the powerful 
hegemon that had once invented cooperative institutions to maximize American influence, they further 
thought, had the power to dissolve these institutions, on the presumption that the only remaining 
superpower was now strong enough to steer the globalized world alone. ‘The prospect of war has 
divided the United Nations Security Council, riven the most enduring military alliance of modern 
times, and split the European Union’, the Financial Times pronounced sombrely as war approached.
50 
The US carried out ‘willful destruction of the international security system during the past few months’, 
concluded the paper’s columnist Philip Stephens shortly thereafter.
51  
‘The Iraq war is not legitimate self-defence. It is not humanitarian intervention. And it is not crisis 
control’, commented a representative German editorial in the Süddeutsche Zeitung. ‘The war hollows 
out the international ban on violence; it leaves war to the whim of the stronger. The power of this 
negative model leads to geopolitical destruction; if it is legitimate for the US to conduct a preventive 
war, then it will be easy for other states to do so too.’
52 
In the last few weeks before war began, there was further French-American sparring over the 
inconclusive UN inspections of Iraqi nuclear programs. The French wanted to prolong the inspections; 
the US, now that its military build-up in the Gulf was complete, did not want to relax the pressure on 
Saddam Hussein. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Prime Minister Tony Blair took their evidence 
about the threat of Iraqi WMD to the UN and Westminster respectively; their governments’ string of 
public presentations would soon turn out to have been riddled with forgeries, plagiarism from a 
student paper, misrepresentation of the use of some cylinders imported by the Iraqis, and hearsay 
reports from Iraqi exile groups close to the Pentagon hawks.
53 On March 7 the US and Britain gave 
Baghdad a deadline to disarm or be disarmed. On March 11, as Blair faced rebellious backbenchers, 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld set off a storm in Britain by remarking that even if Blair couldn’t get a 
majority, British forces didn’t really matter anyway, since the US could handle this task on its own. 
Westminster, after the only serious debate about the war in any allied parliament, did give the 
prime minister his majority. In what was widely regarded as the best speech of his career, Tony Blair 
reviewed ‘Saddam’s lies, deception and obstruction’ in a decade of flouting UN bans on Iraqi 
development of WMD. He refuted the ‘absurd’ claim that it could be credible that Hussein had now 
destroyed these weapons. He reprimanded France for placating the Iraqi tyrant in the face of the ‘two 
begetters of chaos’ in the 21st century—‘tyrannical regimes with WMD and extreme terrorist groups Elizabeth Pond 
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who profess a perverted and false view of Islam.’ The great ‘danger to the UN is inaction’ and loss of 
credibility in the next confrontation, he said. The current state of affairs was ‘the consequence of 
Europe and the United States dividing from each other.’ Failure of Europeans to stand by the US now, 
he warned, would ‘be the biggest impulse to unilateralism there could ever be.’
54 
A third of the prime minister’s own Labour MPs defected on the vote. Their concern was voiced by 
Robin Cook, the former secretary of foreign affairs and one of two members of Blair’s government to 
resign over the war. In his emotional resignation speech, Cook declared, ‘A US administration visibly 
dominated by vice-president Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld […] scorns the multilateralism at 
the core of Mr Blair’s strategic vision […] The shredding of international support for America’s stance 
over recent months has represented the biggest foreign policy defeat since the Vietnam War. Worse 
still, Messrs Cheney and Rumsfeld scarcely care […] We are back […] to the Hobbesian world in 
which right is measured only by might. That’s what frightens me.’
55 
On March 19 war began; within three weeks Baghdad fell. American and British troops, 
constituting 99 percent of the expeditionary force, won on their own.
56 There was no contingent of 
160,000 troops from 32 Arab, European, and Asian states as there had been in George H. W. Bush’s 
war. On the contrary, in mid-April Schröder and Chirac added insult to injury by enlisting Russia’s 
Vladimir Putin to join them in calling for international rather than unilateral US supervision of Iraq’s 
post-war reconstruction.
57 And in late April Schröder, Chirac, and their Belgian and Luxembourg 
counterparts ostentatiously met in what got nicknamed derisively ‘the chocolate summit’ to start a 
European defence avant garde that the US understood as a challenge to NATO and American 
leadership.
58 As the triumphant George Bush landed on an aircraft carrier on May 1 to declare the war 
over in front of a banner proclaiming ‘Mission Accomplished’, he had as yet little reason to seek 
reconciliation with the Germans and French. 
On the battlefield, Rumsfeld’s gamble on a fast, light 21st-century cavalry with night-sight goggles, 
laser-guided munitions, and laptops paid off. The sceptics’ fears did not materialize. There were no 
blazing oilfields, no streams of refugees, no house-to-house fighting with high American casualties, no 
seizure of northern Kurdish territory by Turks or of eastern territory by Iranians, no eruptions on the 
Arab street, no worsening of Intifada violence. The biggest prize of all, a dishevelled, disoriented, and 
visibly aged Saddam Hussein who had survived the war by hiding ignominiously in tiny holes in the 
ground near his native Tikrit, was captured alive nine months after the war began. 
Aftermath 
In stabilizing post-war Iraq, however, Rumsfeld’s lean dream army performed less well. Reluctantly, 
the administration accepted that it was now responsible in Iraq for the nation-building it so detested. 
But the Defense Department, persuaded that the Iraqi population would welcome its American 
liberators as the Afghanis had welcomed them, discarded the detailed State Department planning for 
reconstruction, relied on the assurances of the exiles that democracy would blossom once Saddam 
Hussein was gone, did not secure hospitals and museums and electricity infrastructure against the 
initial rampage of looting—and disbanded the Iraqi army. The British, with decades of imperialism 
behind them, counselled otherwise. So did the Germans, who on unification had peacefully integrated 
the hundreds of thousands of East German soldiers into the Bundeswehr overnight. By the end of 
2003, public water and electricity had still not been restored to pre-war levels in the country, and 
popular complaints were mounting.
59 The US army turned out to be both undermanned and untrained 
for the job of civilian security and administration it was now responsible for. Soldiers’ repatriation 
home was repeatedly postponed; the call-up of reserves reached its highest level since the Korean 
War; uniformed officers worried that so much of their combat capability was being tied down in Iraq 
that they could not fulfil all their other global commitments.  
Worst of all was the security situation, both for Iraqis and for foreigners. Reported murders and rapes 
and abductions of women rose.
60 Two key moderate Shiite clerics were murdered in the first months The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy Over Iraq 
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after victory. GIs in tanks, with no knowledge of Arabic or local customs, proved to be poor urban 
policemen. The guerrilla war, as US Central Command General John P. Abizaid called it, soon claimed 
more lives from the US and its allies than the war itself had claimed. Suicide and stand-off attacks on the 
local UN headquarters, the Red Cross, Italian soldiers, the embassies of countries that backed the US, 
and Iraqi policemen cooperating with the US drove most of the international staff of the UN, Red Cross, 
and other non-governmental organizations out of the country. The attacks also drove American (rather 
more than British) soldiers behind barricades and made them act like occupiers rather than liberators. 
The presumed culprits were Hussein loyalists, fundamentalist Arabs from other countries drawn by the 
rich Western target opportunities in Iraq—and some of those hundreds of thousands of disbanded, 
unemployed Iraqi soldiers. Bombs also began exploding for the first time in Saudi Arabia. 
Just before the war the ever-optimistic Blair set forth the hope that after the war the transatlantic 
community could put the bitter differences behind it and reunite in two common projects. The first 
would be rebuilding Iraq, with the Europeans joining the US wholeheartedly in the reconstruction, and 
with the US ceding a major political role to the international community, as represented by the UN. 
The second—following the pattern of President George H. W. Bush’s action after defeating Iraq in the 
early 1990s—would be advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process toward a two-state solution as 
outlined in the ‘roadmap’ sketched out by the ‘Quartet’ of the US, Europe, the UN, and Russia.
61 
Unfortunately for Blair’s vision of transatlantic reconciliation, both projects failed. In the view of 
Europeans, Bush, while stating his support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, never put his own 
representative on the ground to keep the process going, and did not give Secretary of State Powell full 
authority.
62 The attempt had barely gotten underway when Intifada bombers once again derailed the 
peace process with violence. 
Nor did any of the post-war Iraqi issues serve as a transatlantic unifier. The first major dispute 
arose from the embarrassing failure of elite US teams to find any weapons of mass destruction in 
Iraq—one of the main reasons cited for going to war—despite thousands of man hours of searching. 
The impression hardened that Hussein had probably not had any significant WMD weapons programs 
since international inspectors found and destroyed more weapons in the mid-1990s than those 
destroyed in the 1990/91 Iraq war. The absence of WMD—the strongest reason cited for going to war 
in the first place—confirmed the instincts of European critics of the US and put Tony Blair through his 
second domestic trial by fire. In Washington, a blame game for the fiasco of pre-war intelligence 
pitted the White House against the CIA, but did not have much impact on transatlantic relations. 
Similarly, Iraqi reconstruction failed to become a uniting catalyst. In September the first face-to-
face meeting between Bush and Schröder in over a year seemed like a good omen. But there was no 
meeting of minds. Germany and France both refused to send their troops to get killed in Bush’s war in 
Iraq. (Poland was initially glad to jump into the breach, take over command of a military sector, get 
paid by Washington to do so, and enjoy a bit of one-upmanship over the Germans.) Berlin and Paris 
further refused to donate to reconstruction sums on the scale they had in underwriting the first 
American-Iraqi war a decade earlier. And they also declined to contribute substantially to the 
reconstruction effort under an American monopoly on political power. Instead, they pressed for a 
major role for the UN. This the United States was unwilling to grant—and after top members of the 
UN team in Iraq were blown up in the suicide bombing at UN headquarters in Iraq, Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan also became reluctant to take on that responsibility in any case. Again, various American 
columnists resented European disloyalty to Washington and unwillingness to pay up.
63  
The next hope for transatlantic reconciliation by Javier Solana and other European officials rested 
on the EU’s first-ever strategy paper that was approved by the EU summit in Brussels in December 
2003; and on EU assumption soon of primary responsibility for security in Bosnia. The EU strategy 
statement went far in naming the same threats that the US strategy statement of a year earlier had 
identified in the mix of terrorism, WMD proliferation, failed states, and organized crime. It counselled 
Europe to extend its immediate zone of security to its nearest neighbours (including, so far as possible, Elizabeth Pond 
12  EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2004/26 © 2004 Elizabeth Pond 
the Balkans, Middle-East, and Caucasus), to spend more on defence and spend it more intelligently—
and to take unspecified preventive action when necessary. 
In retrospect, the sorry tale of transatlantic estrangement in 2002/03 looked to some American 
realists like a predestined, if delayed, reflex after the disappearance of the common Soviet enemy. It’s 
probably safe to say that to most Europeans, however, it looked more like a disastrous 
‘psychodrama’.
64 The American superpower, stung by the 9/11 attack, demanded fealty from allies in 
its global retaliation for the attack. France and Germany, while supporting Washington’s war on 
terrorism with close police and intelligence coordination, resisted American efforts to turn the 
transatlantic alliance from a status-quo preserver of stability into a revolutionary warrior for the spread 
of democracy in the refractory Islamic world. 
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